Napoleons strategy relied heavily on timing and communication which was something which Napoleon had instilled in the structure however on the day of the battle communication was just too slow. Speed, surprise, flexibility and continual adjustment were some of the key advantages in the past with the strategy Napoleon had used however none Of those advantages had occurred on the day Of the battle.
Organizational units must be co-ordinate and actions controlled to support the intended thrust pattern or else the total strategy will fail and this is where Napoleon strategy was usually successful with this however on the day of the battle this is where it went wrong as the correct co-ordinate timing was not instilled and certain actions were not followed as planned such as Grouchy using an outdated formation which cost heavy losses this led to panic overreactions and thus the intended pattern was not being followed.
There is the notion that Napoleon became over-confident, especially after many successes and forgot to remember/ignored the basic strategic principles towards the end of the battle by not reacting when he knew his forces could tot sustain an onslaught from the two combined forces however he took the risk of holding out waiting to see whether Grouchy corps would prevent the two armies combining something which had given Napoleon a huge advantage in previous battles however timing was not right which led to the strategy failing.
Other factors then strategy can effect whether it works or not which is clearly the case with why Napoleons strategy went wrong in waterloo, factors such as lack of resources, stupid implementation and the absence of luck all played a part in the strategy not working out.
The essence f strategy is to build a posture so strong that goals can be achieved despite unforeseeable external forces that interact when the time comes, it may be argued that Napoleons strategy was not strong enough in order to see the strategy the rough when these external forces occurred however “large scale systems can respond quite counterintuitive’ (Forrester, 1971) and seemingly bizarre events can conspire to prevent or assist success. Overall believe the strategy was not wrong but the fact that on the day of the battle lack of communication and slow timing of strategic weapons was what cost